This paper reports laboratory experiments comparing arbitration behavior between and across two developed countries with extensive trade relations, the United States and Japan. Besides comparing domestic disputes in both locations, we evaluate disputes between the two countries. While we find nominal differences between the US and Japan, we observe significant changes in both cultures when facing someone from the other culture. Specifically, Americans become more aggressive when facing a Japanese counterpart and Japanese subjects settle more frequently with an American counterpart.
Introduction
The increasingly global nature of the economy increases the likelihood of disputes between geographically and culturally separated people.
These cross-cultural interactions increasingly extend beyond international negotiations, thereby impacting labor relations, business contracts and legal conflicts. To the extent that cultural norms affect concepts of fairness, patterns of negotiation, or even beliefs regarding the proper procedure for settling disputes, these differences may increase the degree of conflict or make the probability of self-negotiated settlements decline. This creates an imperative that we understand the role that such differences play in conflict resolution in order to facilitate negotiations and/or choose dispute resolution procedures that can encourage settlements.
A significant literature has addressed cross-cultural negotiations in a variety of contexts;
this literature identifies how individuals in various countries behave differently in dimensions that may matter for resolving conflicts. While this information is critical to understand, the literature has failed to ask whether these preferences or behaviors differ when members of one culture engage in bargaining with a member of another culture. In other words, do the identified differences change when agents are working with individuals outside of their culture? This paper fills this void through laboratory experiments in which subjects in the United States and Japan interact in real-time final offer arbitration negotiations, not only within their own groups but also across groups. As such, we are not only able to identify cultural differences, but we are able to identify how subjects alter their behavior when bargaining across cultures. We find that such changes in behavior do occur, suggesting that the vast literature identifying cultural differences is incomplete in helping us understand the interactions of agents across cultures.
The specific form of dispute resolution addressed in this paper is final-offer arbitration (FOA). In the United States, arbitration is widely applied in settling disputes that fail to be negotiated. 1 FOA requires that each party formally submit a final offer, of which the arbitrator then selects one. Proposed by Stevens (1966) , FOA has been employed in Major League Baseball since the 1970s, to resolve salary disputes for players who are not yet eligible for free agency and can only bargain with their current team. It also has been applied to settle public sector labor contract issues where the right to strike is not available to laborers in many countries. As we outline below, there has been an inability for researchers to fully explain agents' behavior in FOA. Given that individuals deviate from theoretically predicted behavior, it is possible that beliefs and social norms, factors that will vary by culture, may influence behavior. To the extent that we can identify such behavior, this work also contributes to the arbitration literature seeking to understand the failure of agents to settle when they are predicted to do so.
Specifically, this paper compares pre-arbitration bargaining and the performance of FOA within and between residents of two countries: the US and Japan. We have two reasons for this choice. First, Japan and the United States have been major trading partners for several decades (Graham and Sano, 1989 ) and a successful dispute resolution method has implications for both economies. Second, the nations are geographically separated and many papers find that they are quite different in cultural background. For example, Hofstede (1991) argues that one dimension of national culture is measured along a continuum from "collectivism" to "individualism". Japan is considered an example of a collectivistic culture while the US is considered an example of an individualistic culture, and Oyserman et al. (2002) find evidence of such differences. Buchan et al. (2004) find that the people in these two countries have different viewpoints of fairness and the role of power that might determine their bargaining behavior. Furthermore, Brett and Okumura (1998) , Beard et al. (2001) , Oosterbeek et al. (2004) find that economic behavior differs significantly between these two countries in many situations. However, Slemrod and Katuščák (2005) find that both the US and Japan are societies that exhibit high levels of trust, potentially making economic transactions across cultures less difficult.
It is difficult to investigate the issue using field data. While naturally occurring data from FOA are available from the US 2 , its application in Japan is rare. 3 Therefore, we rely upon laboratory methods to make this cultural comparison. Laboratory studies also have the advantage that the experimenter can control factors that typically vary across naturally occurring disputes and are often unobservable. For example, in the lab we can control the information each party has about the arbitrator's preferences and the cost of going to arbitration. This could be potentially important in our examination of interactions across the two cultures.
As a prelude to our experimental results, we find that the average resettlement rates were lower within Japan at 64 percent than within the US at 70 percent but the difference is not statistically significant. When agents bargain across cultures, we observe a significantly higher settlement rate of 82 percent. In part, this result may be due to the increased 2 Data are available from Canada as well, but of course the US and Canada are close geographically and culturally. 3 To the authors' knowledge, the only baseball player's salary in Japan determined by FOA was Hiromitsu
Ochiai of Team Chunichi-Dragon in 1991 by FOA (see Asahi News of March 9, 1991).
aggressiveness of US disputants when facing a Japanese rival.
This paper is organized as follows. After a more extensive discussion of the literature, Section 2 presents a basic model of FOA and Section 3 describes our experimental design.
The results are presented in Section 4 followed by some more supporting evidences in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Relevant Arbitration Literature
Under FOA, an aggressive offer requesting a large share is likely to lose resulting in the opponent's offer being implemented. Therefore, researchers originally expected disputants to present compromising offers in the arbitration process. However, game-theoretical studies showed that the offers are unlikely to converge when the arbitrator's notion of fairness is not completely known to the disputants (see Farber 1980, Brams and Merrill 1983) . Despite this result, rational disputants are still expected to reach an agreement in the pre-arbitration negotiation process because it is rational to save their arbitration costs. In other words, the costs create a contract zone within which disputants prefer to settle rather than pursue arbitration. 4 Despite this prediction, real-world disputes frequently enter the arbitration process.
Many authors have addressed the puzzle of why players do not behave as theory suggests.
For example, Shavell (1982) , Priest and Klein (1984) argue that settlement failure arises because parties make mistakes in their assessment of the disputes. Bebchuk (1984) , Reinganum and Wilde (1986) also stressed the role of asymmetric information in explaining settlement failure. However, the empirical study of Farmer et al. (2004) shows that even in cases where information is widely available, such as baseball labor negotiations, the disputants often fail to settle.
The lack of pre-arbitration settlement has consistently been observed in the laboratory through a variety of experimental designs and arbitration mechanisms. Ashenfelter et al. (1992) compares FOA with conventional arbitration and tri-offer arbitration, all of which are used in practice; Dickinson (2004 Dickinson ( , 2005 compares FOA with combined arbitration of Brams and Merill (1986) and double-offer arbitration of Zeng et al. (1996) Henrich (2000) . Although cultural factors are not explicitly incorporated in game-theoretical models yet, it is natural to guess that dispute resolution depends on culture, since it is related to egoism, fairness, equality and reciprocity, which appear to be sensitive to cultural socialization. Given the increase in globalization, it is critical to understand how culture affects behavior and arbitration outcomes both across and between cultures.
International relations scholars have been investigating the role of culture for some time.
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In an effort to refine our knowledge of the influence of culture, Elgström (1999) finds that culture matters more under certain circumstances than it does under others. Following that, Bercovitch and Elgström (2001) find that 4 out of 5 specific measures of cultural differences produce failed mediation results. Moreover, not only do cultures differ in their approaches to international relations negotiations, but there are also significant differences in beliefs regarding the appropriate procedures to utilize in the process of bargaining. Specifically, Fu et al. (2002) find that Chinese and Americans exhibit differences in choosing an appropriate mediator: Chinese agents prefer mutual acquaintances while Americans prefer a party that is unconnected and disengaged from the situation. Similarly, Lew and Shore (1999) find cultural differences in cross 5 Other experimental studies comparing FOA and conventional arbitration include Van Boening (2001, 2004) and Deck and Farmer (2005, in press ). 6 One possible explanation for the low settlement rates in many previous studies is the introduction of additional uncertainty and/or asymmetric information.
examination procedures in litigation settings. With regard to arbitration specifically, Gans (1997) advocates for the use of informal procedures prior to invoking formal arbitration procedures, citing that Japanese businessmen expect to solve their problems themselves. Finally, the president of the American Arbitration Association, William
Slate II cites the importance of cultural understanding, noting that international arbitration procedures are increasingly becoming a blend of cultural procedures and practices.
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In addition to direct examination of cultural differences in international conflict and preferences for dispute resolution mechanisms, there has been considerable research on how differences in individual behaviors, beliefs and preferences that would be expected to impact how agents behave in arbitration. Kilbourne et al. (2005) identify differences in materialism across cultures while Brandts et al. (2004) found differences in spite and cooperation behavior in voluntary contribution mechanisms. Buchan et al. (in press) examine the role that culture plays in a set of "other regarding preferences", (trust, reciprocity and altruism) all of which would likely influence behavior in arbitration. They discover that unlike the US, more collective societies do not exhibit diminished trust as social distance rises. However, as with the rest of this literature, they only investigate the differences on these various dimensions within cultures; they do not investigate whether these cultural differences change when interacting with members of other cultures. Given that there are differences in behavior when agents play within their group than without (Frey and Bohnet 1997) and in light of the differences in reactions to social distance found by Buchan et al. (2004) , analysis of real time, cross-cultural arbitration experiments fill a significant gap in this literature regarding culture.
The model
The game-theoretical model of FOA is simple. Consider two risk-neutral disputants deciding how to allocate a known fixed sum of money Π. The game consists of two stages.
In the first stage, two disputants (players) bargain with each other and try to reach a mutually agreeable resolution. If they fail, then they proceed to the second stage in which arbitration occurs with cost c to each disputant. In arbitration, the arbitrator is assumed to have a belief regarding the fair share for disputant 1, which we denote by z. Thus the fair share for disputant 2 is Π-z. Neither disputant knows z exactly. For the sake of the experiments, we assume that z is distributed as a random variable on [0, Π] with uniform distribution. 9 The randomness regarding the fairness might result from the fact that different arbitrators have different notions of fairness and the indeterminacy in selecting arbitrators (Bloom and Cavanagh, 1986) . According to Brams and Merrill (1983) , offers x*=Π, y*=0 constitute the unique Nash equilibrium in this 0-sum game. The expected payoff of two players are both Π/2-c. The contract zone is defined as the set of settlements preferred by both disputants to reaching arbitration. If the arbitration cost c is positive, then two disputants are expected to reach a 9 A uniform distribution is easier to describe to subjects than other distributions. For example, Ashenfelter et al. (1992) describe a normal distribution to subjects through a table with 100 random draws from the distribution. 10 While most papers in the literature assume that the arbitrator's sense of fairness is independent of the offers, Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) , Ashenfelter (1987) and Gibbons (1988) , consider situations in which the arbitrator learns from disputant behavior.
pre-arbitration agreement. The range of possible agreements is [Π/2-c, Π/2+c] and is referred to as the contract zone. 
Experimental Design
We conducted as series of four experimental sessions for each of the three treatments determined by the location of the subjects. In the UU treatment, both parties were students at the University of Arkansas. 12 Disputants in the JJ treatment were both students at Kagawa University in Takamatsu Japan. Lastly, the UJ treatment matched students at the University of Arkansas against students at Kagawa University. Each subject participated in only one session.
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A session began with the subjects reading written directions and completing a comprehension quiz. 14 For the UU and JJ treatments, the subjects knew that their randomly selected counterparts were in the same room. However, for the UJ treatment, the subjects were told that their counterparts were being randomly selected from a group of people on the other side of the world. To help ensure the existence of the counterparts, web cameras were used to broadcast live images of each lab. The subjects at each location could see the people at the other lab. Further one subject in the US was randomly selected to draw a pattern on a sheet of paper and show it to the camera. Then a randomly selected subject in Japan copied that pattern on a sheet of paper and showed it to the camera. The procedure was then reversed allowing the Japanese subject to draw some new symbol, which was redrawn by the American subject.
After all questions had been answered, the computerized experiment began. The experiment consisted of two phases. In the first 15 periods subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned a counterpart. The two parties both made final offers for the computerized arbitrator to consider. As was common information for the subjects, the 11 Risk aversion (risk seeking) preferences would increase (decrease) the width of the contract zone.
Disputant optimism, that is the parties holding different beliefs as to the distribution of z, would also impact the size and location of the contract zone. 12 The data reported for the UU treatment are also reported in . 13 While some of the subjects had participated in unrelated experiments, none had participated in previous experiments involving bargaining or arbitration.
arbitrator's preferred outcome was randomly selected from the interval [0, 100] . 15 For these first 15 periods, c = 0 as the subjects had no choice but to be in arbitration. A one page sheet of direction was distributed after the end of the first phase and this was the first the subjects learned of a second phase. The second phase of the experiment allowed the randomly selected counterparts to bargain for one minute prior to going to arbitration.
During the minute either party could make a proposal or accept the counterpart's standing proposal. Any pair that reached a self negotiated agreement did not go to arbitration and the two parties were not charged the cost of c = 15. The second phase consisted of 10 periods.
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Following Roth et al. (1991) , we were careful to minimize the effects of uncontrolled procedural differences across locations. The same experimenters conducted all of the sessions. 17 Unfortunately, this dictated that the treatments were not all conducted at the same time and hence the exchange rate varied somewhat. The payoffs in the experiment were denominated in Experiment Dollars. A subjects' payoff was converted into cash at the rate of Experiment Dollars 100 = $1 = ¥100. At the time of the JJ sessions the exchange rate was approximately $1 ≈ ¥106 and for the UJ sessions it was $1 ≈ ¥116.
Hence the real payoffs are similar but not identical. Of course, studies done in different cities in the same country or over an extended period of time have different real incentives given variation in the cost of living. For each laboratory session, subjects were recruited to the lab for one hour and paid a shop up fee of $5 or ¥500.
To keep the designs parallel across treatments, the number of subjects differed across treatments. In the JJ and UU treatments, where everyone was in the same room, 4 subjects participated in each session. Hence, for any subject there were three other people who could be randomly selected as a counterpart in a given period. In the UJ treatment there were 6 subjects, three at each laboratory, so that again there were three possible 14 Copy of the directions and the handouts are available from the authors upon request. 15 Throughout the experiment and the directions neutral terms were used; counterpart for opponents, random number for arbitrator's preferred outcome, etc.. 16 Two of the JJ sessions had fewer second phase periods (6 and 7 periods respectively) due to time constraints. The instructions for the experiment and the computer interface were initially written in English for the US subjects. The directions were subsequently translated into Japanese by Zeng and one of his Japanese students for the Japanese subjects. Unfortunately, translating the subject's computer interface was not practical as Japanese characters require more bytes than English characters. To make the software informative to the Japanese subjects, symbols replaced text on the screen. For example, the symbol " " replaced the word "counterpart." The English directions and software for the UJ treatment also used the pictorial representation.
Results
The data consist of 420 pairs of disputants in arbitration during the first phase of the experiment and 266 pairs of disputants who had the opportunity to settle pre-arbitration in the second phase. As pairs were randomly selected each period from the subjects in a given session, the observations are not independent within sessions but are independent across sessions. Therefore we rely upon non-parametric tests of session level data and use econometric models that handle repeated measures for decision level data. To control for possible learning effects we omit data from the five initial periods of the experiment. We begin our analysis by focusing on the offers that are made in arbitration during the first phase of the experiment. Figure 1 shows the distribution of offers by location of the counterpart. The left hand panel is for subjects in the US and the right hand panel is for subjects in Japan.
Evident from these figures is that US subjects are more aggressive when paired with a subject in Japan than when paired with another subject in the US. However, Japanese subjects appear to be equally aggressive against counterparts from either country. This pattern is borne out statistically. We estimate a linear mixed effects model for the average offer. This model estimates a fixed effect for the treatments while allowing for each subject and each session to have a random effect. . Offer ijt is the offer made by subject j in session i during period t. JapSub ij and JapCount ij are dummy variables that take on the value 1 if subject j in session i was Japanese and had a Japanese counterpart, respectively. Table 1 gives the results of the estimation for the treatment effects. While the theoretical prediction for risk-neutral agents with common beliefs of arbitrator behavior is an offer of 100, consistent with many previous studies of FOA, what we observe is substantially more moderate. On average, US subjects with counterparts in the US make final offers of 56.4. US subjects make offers of 56.4 + 10.5 ≈ 66.9 when facing Japanese counterparts. Japanese subjects make nominally higher offers when facing US counterparts (56.4 + 4.1 ≈ 60.5) than US subjects do when facing US counterparts (56.4), but the difference is not significant (p-value = 0.3424). Further, Japanese subjects are only slightly less aggressive against Japanese counterparts (56.4 + 4.1 + 10.5 -12.6 ≈ 58.4) than they are against US counterparts (60.5). 18 Ultimately there is no statistical difference between offers in the UU and JJ treatments (56.4 v 58.4).
We now focus on the settlement rate, a typical measure of an arbitration mechanism's success. Figure 2 plots the self negotiated pre-arbitration settlement rates by session. A random effects probit model also leads to the same conclusion that Japanese subjects 18 This difference is not significant based upon a likelihood ratio test at any standard significance level. 19 The figure and associated statistics are essentially unchanged if attention is restricted to the first 6 bargaining periods, the minimum number periods in any session.
are more likely to settle with US counterparts than with Japanese counterparts. One reason that is often suggested for disputes arising even when both parties have complete information is optimism. It seems reasonable that the degree of a subject's optimism (if it exists) is related to her payoff performance thus far in the experiment including the first phase of 15 rounds when bargaining was not possible. Thus in looking at how culture impacts the likelihood that a group will reach arbitration, we allow for this effect to differ by treatment. Table 2 provides the estimation results for a random effects probit model where the estimating equation for the probability a pair p in session j will reach arbitration is given by Φ(β 0 +β 1 UJ j +β 2 JJ j +β 3 AvgPay jp +β 4 UJ j ×AvgPay jp +β 5 JJ j ×AvgPay jp + ζ j )
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
JJ and UJ are dummy variables for the treatments. AvgPay is the average of the two disputant's average payoff per period through the previous periods as a deviation from the expected amount of 50. Hence the baseline case is the UU treatment where the average per period payoff of the two parties is 50. Based upon the estimation, we do not observe any effect of previous performance (Ho: β 3 = β 4 = β 5 = 0, likelihood ratio test statistic = 3.344, p-value = 0.3416). This result suggests that the optimism is not a reason of the pre-arbitration failures. Given this result, we re-estimated the equation imposing that β 3 = β 4 = β 5 = 0. That agreements are less likely in JJ than UJ is evidenced by the fact that we reject the null hypothesis that β 1 = β 2 (likelihood ratio test statistic = 6.151, p-value = 0.0131).
Theory predicts not only that parties should settle, but that they should settle in the contract zone, which is the interval [35, 65] given the parameters. Overall, the vast majority of disputants settled inside the contract zone conditioned on having reached an agreement; 88 percent in UU, 93 percent in JJ, and 97 percent in UJ. 20 The attraction of the contract zone is evident from Figure 3 which plots the frequency of a given split by treatment. Since any agreement allocates the entire 100 experimental dollars, the pairs are identified by the size of the lion's share. The column NA denotes pairs that did not reach an agreement. Clearly the agreements are overwhelmingly for near equal shares of the surplus, a result that is not too surprising given previous experimental studies of bargaining, see Kagel and Roth (1995) . But one may wonder why there is greater agreement typically with an equal split in UJ even though the subjects are more aggressive during arbitration in this 20 The observed settlements are also consistent with a moderate degree of risk aversion as the settlements are well within the bounds of the risk neutral contract zone.
treatment.
In fact, both the Japanese subjects and the US subjects take softer bargaining stances in the pre-arbitration phase of the international disputes. Looking at the final proposals made pre-arbitration for pairs that did not reach agreement, Japanese subjects were demanding 65.6 on average from their countrymen as compared to 61.6 from Americans.
Similarly, US subjects demanded more of their own countrymen asking for 63.8 on average than the 58.2 requested from Japanese subjects. This pattern is consistent with the early theory regarding FOA. The more aggressive people are once they reach arbitration, which is the case here with the international disputes, the riskier arbitration is and the greater the incentive to settle ex ante is. As demonstrated above, the US subjects are more aggressive in international arbitration and in fact 62 percent of the agreements in UJ arise from a Japanese subject accepting a proposal made by their US counterpart prior to reaching arbitration. For pairs that reached agreement, the Americans received 50.2 on average in the UJ treatment. Given the constant sum nature of the problem, this average was necessarily 50 for agreements in JJ and UU.
Thus, not only do we find evidence that US agents alter their behavior when paired with a Japanese subject, but we also find support for the theory of FOA in that as arbitration becomes riskier, settlement increases. The increased aggression of US subjects has the socially positive effect of increasing settlement rates, but the distribution of the surplus is shifted in their favor as well.
Broader Cultural Investigation
Two aspects of behavior that seem particularly relevant to how disputants behave are their risk preferences and desire to cooperate. Thus we would like to know if US and Japanese subjects differ in these dimensions. To explore this we rely upon a set of auction and public goods experiments respectively. There is however, a wealth of laboratory data on how US subjects behave in laboratory experiments, and thus we conducted the experiments with new Japanese subjects at Kagawa University and briefly compare what we observed to previously reported research.
In independent private value auction experiments, subjects are given an induced value for a fictitious good. The winner of the auction is paid the difference in this induced value and the price determined in the market. We consider two auction formats, the first-price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction. In these auctions a subject can increase the chances of winning by trading off the amount of profit conditional on winning. Hence, what bid is placed gives a measure of one's risk attitude. While theoretically equivalent, in a classic paper Cox et al. (1982) find that the first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction lead to different behavior in the lab. We conducted a series of 6 experiments each using five new Japanese subjects. Our experiments were most similar to the dfd9 and dfd9' sessions of Cox et al. (1982) . Table 3 presents the observed average price as a percentage of the theoretically expected price for risk-neutral agents in both studies. Although we observed slightly higher prices in the Dutch auction when it was run in the first 10 periods, the Japanese subjects behave similarly to the US subjects.
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This similarity provides further support for our lack of a within culture effect of placing final offers during arbitration. Samuelson (1991) and Zeng (2003) show that that FOA is similar to a first-price auction with two bidders; a more aggressive offer is less likely to be implemented but results in a higher payoff conditional on it being selected by the arbitrator. While the act of arbitration is like an auction, pre-arbitration bargaining can be viewed as a kind of cooperation. To explore issues of cooperation we also conducted public goods experiments in Japan with the voluntary contributions mechanism. With the voluntary contributions mechanism, each subject has an endowment of tokens that can be invested in a private account earning a return of 1 or in a group account which has a return x to each individual in the group. In a classic paper, Isaac and Walker (1988) examine how the return rate x known as the marginal per capita return (MPCR) impacts contributions. Figure 4 plots the average percentage of tokens contributed to the public good from 6 21 See Kagel and Roth (1995) for a more general discussion of auction experiments.
sessions with four new Japanese subjects per session for MPCRs of 0.3 and 0.75. Also plotted are the average contribution rates observed by Isaac and Walker (1988) for groups of size four with these same MPCRs. 22 In general, the Japanese subjects generate a similar pattern in which contribution decline over time and are higher with a larger MPCR. 23 Again, this provides additional support for our lack of a within culture effect. 
Conclusions
This paper examines cultural differences in arbitration. If we simply compare behavior within the US to behavior within Japan, we do not observe significant differences. That is, disputants from both cultures place similar offers in arbitration and the face the same probability of reaching arbitration in domestic disputes. The examination of behavior across cultures is where previous studies have stopped; however, it is incomplete. When we directly evaluate intercultural pairs, we see that the behavior of US subjects changes as they become more aggressive, seeking a larger share of the surplus. Meanwhile, Japanese subjects become more likely to settle ex ante in international disputes, behavior 22 There are several differences between the studies such as the number of tokens in the endowment of each subject and the degree of experience of the subjects. The Japanese subjects had not been in VCM experiment previously whereas Isaac and Walker (1988) subjects had. In both studies there is considerable variation across sessions. 23 See Kagel and Roth (1995) for a discussion of experimental results in public goods experiments. Our results are somewhat at odds with previous work by Cason, et al. (2002) who find that Japanese subjects are more spiteful than Americans in a within culture comparison. However, their experimental design differed from our standard VCM.
that is theoretically consistent with facing their more aggressive US counterparts. In both cases we find the same nominal pattern for the other culture as well, but the effect is not significant.
Such intercultural effects are important in an ever more global economy. We present evidence that the shift is not simply a function of varied attitudes of risk, cooperation, or optimism. It is possible that the behavioral changes are due to the two groups failing to anticipate the similar predispositions along these lines. An alternative explanation is the degree of separation in the experiments. Previous research has shown that social distance can greatly impact behavior. In particular Cox and Deck (2005) find that U.S. subjects behave in a more monetarily self-interested way as social distance increases. However, Buchan et al. (in press) find that Japanese subjects do not respond to social distance this way. This could explain in part why we observe more aggressiveness by US subjects in international disputes than domestic ones, but do not see the same change in Japanese subjects. In terms of pre-arbitration negotiations, there may be several possible explanations for the increased willingness of subjects to settle subjects when in an international dispute. First, settlement is theoretically more attractive when arbitration becomes riskier, an outcome that arises from the increased aggression of the US subjects' behavior in arbitration. Alternatively, one could argue that subjects in the intercultural experiments were more aware that they were representing their culture, and thus wanted to present a good image. While this may be the case, much like the increased social distance, such a cultural representation is an inherent part of naturally occurring international disputes as well.
Our findings suggest that future research is warranted to determine the reasons behind the behavioral changes in these international negotiations and to determine if they exist in other contexts. One thing is clear, however; it is not at all sufficient to simply document the differences in subjects' behaviors across cultures, but it is critical to identify and understand the motivations behind the fact that subjects alter their behaviors when facing a member of another culture.
